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The expression "the right to die" is ambiguous. It can mean a liberty to be
immune from coercive interventions which would prevent death and prolong the
dying process. But this meaning is better expressed by saying that it is an aspect of
our right to life, bodily integrity, and personal inviolability. In another sense it can
mean an entitlement to the means, including the acts of another, necessary to
bring about death. This is the sense the expression has for those who subscribe to
the philosophy of the Society for the Right to Die, formerly called the Euthanasia
Society, and of the Hemlock Society. The right to die in this sense is also defended
by those who accept the "Plea for Beneficent Euthanasia" drafted by Marvin
Kohl and Paul Kurtz, who hold that belief in the value and dignity of the
individual person "requires respectful treatment, which entails the right to
reasonable self-determination," and conclude that "no rational morality can
categorically forbid the termination oflife if it has been blighted by some horrible
malady for which all known remedial measures are unavailing."1 It is a right to
choose death, a right to be killed.
It is not irrelevant, in my opinion, to note that a right of this kind seems to be
implied by the understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment undergirding the
recent Supreme Court decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. In that case
Justices Souter, Kennedy, and O'Connor gave as one of the central reasons for
reaffirming the "central holding" of Roe v. Wade the meaning of "liberty" in the
Fourteenth Amendment. According to them, matters "involving the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart ofliberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were
they formed under compulsion of the State. "2 Surely, one of the "most intimate
and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime," and "central to personal
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dignity and autonomy," is the choice whether or not one wishes to be killed.
Here I will argue that there is no "right to die" in this sense. I will first
summarize the reasons advanced to support this alleged right by its advocates and
then present a critique of those reasons. In this paper I will not consider the
reasons advanced by those defending the "right to die" and "beneficent
euthanasia" for extending this "right" to noncompetents by allowing others to
exercise it for them by proxy and thus to engage in "beneficent non voluntary
euthanasia."3 I will consider only the arguments for "voluntary euthanasia," or
the exercise of the "right to die" by competent individuals.
The Argument for the "Right to Die" or "Beneficent Euthanasia"

The basic argument to support the "right to die" or "beneficent voluntary
euthanasia" can be fairly summarized as follows: In voluntary euthanasia the
person to be killed kindly wishes to be killed; hence, no one is doing that person
an injustice by killing him. The person's desire to be killed is reasonable in view of
the suffering and/ or humiliation he is experiencing; at times, others are suffering
terribly too, psychologically or economically or both. Killing this person, who,
after all, freely consents to being killed and who may even be begging to be killed,
is thus a reasonable way to end all this suffering. While it is true that some persons
in our society object to killing of this kind on the grounds that it is immoral and
constitutes an attack on some presumed "sanctity of life," it would be both cruel
and unjust to impose their values on someone who freely chooses to be killed and
on those who seek compassionately to help this person realize this choice. Thus,
the argument concludes, voluntary beneficent euthanasia, which respects the
person's right to die, is both morally right and ought to be legally permissible. 4
The argument just advanced provides support for the legalization of a "right to
die" or of voluntary euthanasia and claims that it is morally right for human
persons. It has, therefore, anthropological and moral presuppositions. The
anthropological presupposition concerns the meaning of "human person," while
the moral presupposition concerns the proper way to make good moral choices. I
will now seek to identify these presuppositions by examining the writings of some
of the more prominent advocates of the "right to die" and beneficent euthanasia. 5
I will first take up the anthropological presupposition, which sharply
distinguishes between bodily or biological life and personal or biographical life. 6
The former is the condition for the latter and is of value only as the necessary
substratum for the latter. Once the qualities associated with personal life are
unrealizable, or until these qualities are attainable, bodily or biological life is of no
real, personal value. On this view the person is the self-conscious subject, aware
of itself as a self and capable of relating to other selves and of controlling
subpersonal nature, including bodily and physical life.
This understanding of the relationship between personal life and bodily life is
reflected in the writings of leading advocates of the right to die. I will now show
this by examining briefly the writings of three such proponents, Joseph Fletcher,
Daniel C. Maguire, and Marvin Kohl, whose expression of this mentality is
typical.
Fletcher is by far the most explicit in presenting this understanding of the
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human person. He insists on the "right of spiritual beings to use intelligent control
over physical nature rather than to submit beastlike to its blind workings."7 He
likens the morality of euthanasia to that of contraception, saying: "Death control,
like birth control, is a matter of human dignity. Without it persons become
puppets."8 For Fletcher, bodily life belongs to the impersonal world of nature, of
"its." Human persons have the right to dispose of this physical, impersonal "it" in
order to serve such personal goods as freedom, choice, and responsibility.9
Maguire, the most ardent Catholic champion of "death by choice" or the
"right to die,"lo holds, as does Fletcher, that the human person - the conscious,
rational subject - has the right to subject physical nature to rational control, and
he includes the bodily life of the human person or what he terms "biochemical
and organic factors" in the world of physical nature. Echoing Fletcher, he
proclaims that just as "birth control, for a very long time, was impeded by the
physicalistic ethic that left moral man at the mercy of his biology" until
"technological man discovered that he was morally free to intervene creatively
and to achieve birth control by choice," so the same physicalistic ethic has
condemned man "to await the good pleasure of biochemical and organic factors
and allow these to determine the time and manner of his demise." Now, however,
Maguire continues, technological man can creatively intervene, and has a moral
right to intervene, in order "to terminate life either through positive action or
calculated benign neglect rather than to await in awe the dispositions of organic
tissue."" Bodily life for Maguire, as for Fletcher, is a "merely biological" good,
not a personal good.
The distinction between bodily and personal life is not so sharply made by
Kohl as it is by Fletcher and Maguire. But it is nonetheless a controlling aspect of
his defense of beneficent euthanasia. Throughout his writings he stresses the
supremacy of such human and personal values as dignity and rational control in
comparison to the value of bodily or physical existence. Kohl admits that many
people oppose the movement to legalize euthanasia on the grounds that it is
destructive, not protective, of human dignity insofar as it involves killing people.
He is willing to concede that one may legitimately speak of the inherent dignity of
human beings as connoting "excellences that set human beings apart from other
species. "12 But he insists that this sort of dignity is not pertinent to the question of
euthanasia. What is of supreme importance is another sort of dignity, an extrinsic
dignity that consists "in having reasonable control over the major and significant
aspects of one's life."13 This sort of dignity, he says, grounds our right to determine
ourselves, and its exercise can at times require the choice to kill oneself or
another. The central dignity of the person is "the actual ability of a human being
to rationally determine and control his way of life and death and to have this
acknowledged and respected by others."14 From this it follows that bodily life as
such is subordinate and inferior to personal dignity. Thus actions destructive of
bodily life are morally justifiable and legally permissible if they can enhance or
protect the value of rational self-determination and control.
Now to the moral or methodological presupposition behind the defense of the
"right to die," i.e., the way the advocates of this right believe we ought to make
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good moral judgments and choices, particularly in problematic or conflict
situations such as that confronting us when we are trying to determine how we
ought properly to care for a dying person or how we ourselves ought to choose
when we are dying from some terrible malady. The advocates of the "right to
die," it seems clear to me, hold that we ought to examine the alternatives and
choose the one which promises the greater good or at least the lesser evil. They
admit that death is, in some sense at least, an evil because it ends our life. But they
hold that the choice of death and the choice to kill are morally upright when
ordered to the protection of a good that is greater than physical life itself, a good
such as personal dignity. Death is a disvalue, an evil of sorts, but we can choose
death as a means to a good greater than bodily life itself.
This methodology, which can be called proportionalistic, or the ethic of the
proportionate good, is clearly articulated in the writings of Fletcher and Maguire.
Fletcher stresses that the end justifies the means. In saying this he does not mean
that any end can justify any means, but rather that we may rightly choose to do
evil or effect a disvalue if there is a proportionate good that will be served by
doing so, a good proportionately great enough to justify the willingness to effect
the disvalue. Thus he writes: "The priority of the end is paired with the principle
of 'proportionate good'; any disvalue in the means must be outweighed by the
value gained in the end."15 In the case at hand, the beneficent killing of suffering
persons who beg to be killed, the proportionate good serving as the end justifying
the killing is the good of personal integrity or human dignity.16
Maguire also champions the ethics of proportionate good. He claims that the
most important thing to consider in determining whether it is morally right to
choose to do an evil is "whether there is a proportionate reason to permit or
intend [an evil such as death]."17 Indeed, the "basic category" for determining
whether an action is morally right is the category of proportionate reason. IS
Applying this principle to the choice to kill oneself or another for reasons of
mercy, Maguire holds that such deeds are morally right so long as a good greater
than physical life is served, a good such as personal integrity or the freedom of
self-determination. 19
Kohl, although he does not use the language of "proportionate good" or
"proportionate reason," clearly uses the same ethical methodology. For him the
key value in justifying beneficent euthanasia is the personal dignity which
consists in "having reasonable control over the major and significant aspects of
one's life," and protection of the dignity is the "overriding reason" justifying the
choice to kill someone mercifully - what makes it to be a "beneficent" act. 20
The Argument Against the "Right to Die" and "Beneficent" Euthanasia

Here I will first challenge the anthropological and moral methodological
presuppositions behind the defense of a "right to die" and "beneficent"
euthanasia, and then present a counterargument to the principal argument
advanced to gain legal recognition of this right.
The anthropological presupposition is that we must distinguish sharply
between physical or bodily life and biographical or personal life. On this
38

Linacre Quarterly

J

i

t

presupposition there are two components of human beings. One component, the
one really good and valuable, is the personal, which consists in the self-awareness
of the individual and his or her capacity to control affairs through personal
choice. 21 This is obviously a dualistic presupposition that is philosophically
untenable. 22 Dualism of this kind makes it impossible for us to understand how a
human being can be one being and not several. It renders utterly inexplicable our
experienced unity of ourselves as bodily beings whose bodies are animated by a
principle that also capacitates us to be the kind of bodily beings radically capable
of discriminating between true and false propositions and of determining our
selves by our own free choices. We personally are our bodies. When we break
our arms we do not say that we have damaged our instruments but that we have
hurt ourselves. 23
The life of a living being is indistinguishable from the very reality of the being,
a reality which pervades and includes everything that the being does. "Life," as
two philosophers put it, "is not a characteristic of one part of a whole [the bodily
aspect] and [personal] activities properties of some other part of it [the personal
aspect)."24 Rather the same life permeates all the activities of the one human
being, the one human person. Thus when my body dies, I die. Death is not the
separation ofthe "person" from the "body." It is the death of the person. 25 Bodily
life is not merely a condition for personal life; it is an integral component of
personal life. Bodily life, therefore, participates in the dignity of the person.
The second, or moral-methodological, presupposition of the ethics of
beneficent euthanasia is that the proper way to make good moraljudgments and
choices, particularly in conflict situations, is to examine the alternatives and then
choose that alternative which promises the greater proportion of good over evil,
which promises the "proportionate" good.
Each of us would obviously agree with the proposal that one ought to choose
the alternative promising the greater "good" if by good is understood what is
morally good, for the morally good choice is, after all, the one we are seeking to
make in our efforts to shape our lives responsibly. But when the proportionalists
advance choosing the greater good as the fundamental principle for making moral
choices they are not using the term good in a moral sense. They are referring to
good in the sense that it designates some perfection or set of perfections that
contribute to the flourishing of human persons and communities, to good in the
sense that life and health, justice, friendship, knowledge ofthe truth, and things of
this kind are "good." Their assumption is that we can weigh or measure these
goods in such a way that we can determine which among them is greater so that
pursuing it justifies our choice deliberately to damage, destroy, or impede other
"goods."
But this assumption, namely, that the human goods at stake in making choices
(goods like human life itself, knowledge of the truth, and their instantiations or
realizations in specific persons) are commensurable is erroneous. Goods like
these are utterly incomparable and incommensurable. For instance, to compare
the good of life itself to the good of personal dignity or integrity, is like trying to
compare the number 66 with the length of this line. One simply cannot compare
them, for they are incomparably good aspects of the human person. This
November, 1993

39

assumption, in fact, requires that two incompatible conditions be met: "first, that
a morally wrong choice be possible; second, that the alternative which is superior
in terms of the proportion of good to bad be known. But this cannot be, for if the
alternative which is superior in these terms is known, other possibilities fade
away, and there can be no morally wrong choice."26
The right way to make good moral judgments and choices is to choose, and
otherwise will, those and only those alternatives of choice which are compatible
with a love and respect for all the goods of human persons. This means that one
ought not freely and deliberately choose to damage, destroy, or impede what is
really a good, such as life itself, of human persons, a good constitutive of the
well-being or full-being of human persons. Thus one ought not adopt by choice
the proposal to kill innocent human beings.27
From what has been said thus far, one can see that the anthropological and
moral-methodological foundations of the ethic of beneficent euthanasia and the
"right to die" are flimsy indeed. So too is the basic argument they offer to support
their claim that beneficent euthanasia should be legally permitted so that
competent individuals may exercise their "right to die," as I now hope to show.
If beneficent euthanasia is to be legally permitted and adopted as public policy,
it will be necessary first of all to change the laws concerning homicide. It will also
be necessary, to make sure that those to be killed in this "kindly" way give
informed consent to being killed, to establish some kind of legal procedures,
including governmental regulation.
But, as Yale Kamisar and, most notably, Germain Grisez and Joseph Boyle
have pointed out,2S the legalization of voluntary euthanasia will inevitably work
to the serious detriment of many persons who do not want to be killed. Once it is
legally permissible for a person to consent to being killed and for others to help
accomplish this choice of death, many who do not want to be killed will be under
heavy pressure to consent to this "kindly" option. Many who are mortally ill
worry that they are a burden to others and feel guilty for the care they need. Once
they realize that they can, by availing themselves ofthe most technically efficient
solution to the problems they cause by persisting in living, relieve others of the
burden of caring for them they will begin to feel even more guilty should they
stubbornly and perhaps selfishly refuse to consent to being killed. No doubt there
will be occasions when relatives, healthcare personnel, social workers, and others
will urge the dying to consent to this "kindly" treatment.
There are many other serious disadvantages that will result from the
legalization of beneficent voluntary euthanasia, such as abandoning care of the
suffering dying and stopping or slowing work now being done to learn more
about relieving their suffering and meeting their needs. But the most compelling
argument against legalizing voluntary euthanasia is that it will inevitably cause
injustices to many who do not wish to be killed and violate the liberty of all those
in our society who do not accept the worldview of those advocating the "right to
die." I have already noted that making voluntary euthanasia a matter of public
policy will require a change in the law of homicide and will require governmental
regulation of the practice to verify that only persons who want to be killed will be.
The choice to be killed, moreover, is a personal, private choice, one that does not
40

Linacre Quarterly

r'

foster a compelling public good. Should the choice be made legally available it
will either demand extensive governmental regulation, no governmental
regulation, or at least some measure of governmental regulation. Since this is so, I
believe that the following argument, summarizing the position developed by
Grisez and Boyle, not only merits the serious consideration of every person but
also devastates the argument proposed to legalize voluntary euthanasia and the
right to die. The argument can be put this way:
If voluntary euthanasia is legalized without regulation, those who do not wish
to be killed are likely to become unwilling victims; this would deny to them the
protection they presently enjoy under the law of homicide. And since the denial is
to serve a private interest, it will be an injustice. If voluntary euthanasia is
legalized with close regulation which will involve the government in killing,
those who abhor such killing will be involved against their wishes, to the extent
that the government representing them will be used for this purpose. Since the
government's involvement will be required only as a means to promote a private
interest, this state action will unjustly infringe the liberty of all who do not consent
to mercy killing as a good to whose promotion state action might be legitimately
directed. A solution involving a compromise between legalization of voluntary
euthanasia without regulation and legalization with close regulation would mean
some degree of lessened protection together with some degree of government
involvement - a situation which will result in injustice partly due to the reduced
protection of the lives of those who do not wish to be killed and partly due to the
unwilling involvement of those who do not wish to kill. Since the stated
conditions are all the possible conditions under which voluntary euthanasia
could be legalized, legalization is impossible without injustice. Therefore, the
legalization of the "right to die," of voluntary euthanasia, must be excluded. 29
I thus conclude that the "right to die," or beneficent voluntary euthanasia,
lacks moral and jurisprudential foundation. The alleged "right" is spurious, and
the reasoning to support it is specious. 30
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from the grave so that those who believe in him can have hope that they too will rise bodily from the
grave.
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illegitimate effort to apply to this case the principle of double effect (for it is this principle which is
behind Aquinas's analysis of "killing" in legitimate self-defense, when the human act, as specified
by the object of choice, can rightly be described as "self-defense" and not as "killing"). However, I
have not before formally repudiated the position taken in my 1974 article and thus wish to do so
here.
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